UltraGreen.ai evidence & FAQ

Purpose and evidence standard

This note preserves useful company-understanding work that is too detailed for the main investment thesis. It distinguishes reported facts from inference. The company page remains the current investment decision.

What is UltraGreen’s economic core today?

Current verdict: UltraGreen is presently a regulated ICG consumables company; imaging, cloud software, quantification and biosensors are strategic extensions, not established profit engines.

FY2025 group revenue was US$142.4 million. Continuing operations contributed US$137.9 million, while the disposed UltraLinQ business contributed US$4.4 million. The Americas DxG segment produced US$106.5 million of external revenue and the rest-of-world DxG segment US$31.0 million. UGDS produced only about US$0.4 million of external revenue and a US$1.6 million segment operating loss.

The main thesis therefore rests on vial volume, average selling price, regulatory coverage, clinical adoption, supply reliability and cash conversion. It does not require a software valuation.

Uncertainty: The company does not separately disclose IC-Flow revenue, vial pull-through from camera placements, or a detailed profit bridge for the continuing ICG franchise.

Sources: FY2025 annual report, FY2025 results presentation.

Why was UltraLinQ sold?

Current verdict: UltraLinQ was a small, slowing cardiology PACS business that did not fit the fluorescence-guided surgery focus; selling it simplified the portfolio at an attractive gain.

UltraLinQ contributed approximately US$4.4 million of FY2025 revenue and US$0.8 million of NPAT before disposal, versus US$137.9 million of continuing revenue. UltraGreen describes it as a non-core cardiology-focused PACS business. The August 2025 disposal generated a US$23.7 million gain.

The sale did not mean all software capability was abandoned. Selected UltraLinQ employees were retained for the new UGDS segment, whose purpose is to develop and commercialise the surgical data platform and distribute LifeSignals products.

Uncertainty: The company has not disclosed a product-level allocation of retained intellectual property, the number of employees retained, or the profitability timetable for UGDS.

Source: FY2025 annual report, pages 21 and 120–122.

Where is the software work located?

Current verdict: The disclosed legal footprint is distributed across the United States, United Kingdom and Denmark; public filings do not establish the physical location or headcount of the full development team.

The annual report lists UltraGreen Data Systems Inc. in the United States and UltraGreen Data Systems Limited in the United Kingdom as software-development subsidiaries. Perfusion Tech ApS in Denmark develops the PerfusionWorks quantification capability. Selected former UltraLinQ employees moved into UGDS.

It is reasonable to describe the structure as a US–UK software operation with specialist perfusion development in Denmark. It is not reasonable to claim exact office locations, team sizes or that one country leads engineering without further disclosure.

Source: FY2025 annual report, subsidiaries and segment notes.

What does the “AI” claim establish?

Current verdict: It identifies the intended product direction—quantitative surgical decision support—but does not yet establish a material software business, recurring revenue stream or proprietary data moat.

PerfusionWorks is intended to quantify tissue perfusion and vascular mapping in real time. The company reports a 2027 launch target, EU MDR work and prior FDA-related clearance for UltraGreen Data Systems. This could improve clinical consistency and reinforce the ICG and imaging ecosystem.

Against that, UGDS revenue was immaterial in FY2025, the segment was loss-making, and UltraGreen has not disclosed paying PerfusionWorks customers, annual recurring revenue, pricing, retention, model performance, dataset scale or incremental margins.

The valuation should therefore assign little current value to AI/software while monitoring regulatory approval, paid deployment and vial pull-through.

Sources: FY2025 annual report, 1Q2026 update.

What is the real moat?

Current verdict: Regulatory depth, manufacturing compliance, clinical evidence, distributor access and repeat workflow adoption are the observable moat; software may deepen it later.

Management states that pharmaceutical registrations typically require about two-and-a-half to six years. UltraGreen has qualified two API suppliers, expanded lyophilisation capacity and sells IC-Green/Verdye across more than 55 countries. FY2025 combined 13% vial growth with 17% ASP growth while gross margin held at 85%.

The counterweight is concentration. Three US distributors accounted for 22.9%, 22.7% and 22.2% of group revenue, and the Americas represented about 75% of external revenue. A quality, regulatory or reimbursement problem affecting ICG would therefore matter more than failure of an individual software project.

Source: FY2025 annual report, operating and major-customer disclosures.

How should the net cash be judged?

Current verdict: It is both downside protection and the next major test of management discipline.

UltraGreen reported US$176.1 million of FY2025 net cash after its IPO. Management prioritises organic regulatory, commercial, imaging and digital investment, selective acquisitions, buybacks and eventual sustainable dividends. In 2026 it also committed capital through convertible notes and adjacent healthcare investments.

The right question is not whether the company can afford these investments, but whether each extension reinforces ICG economics or produces an attractive independent cash return. Net cash should not automatically be added dollar-for-dollar to value if it is likely to fund diffuse or loss-making projects.

Sources: FY2025 annual report, May 2026 use of IPO proceeds.

What remains undisclosed?

• Product-level revenue and profit for ICG vials versus IC-Flow.
• Actual software-development headcount and physical team locations.
• PerfusionWorks pricing, paid sites, recurring revenue, retention and launch economics.
• Evidence that IC-Flow placements create incremental vial demand.
• Customer-level contract duration and the durability of the US pricing increase.
• Return hurdles and expected cash economics for LifeSignals, IHLD, Ferronova and other investments.
• A clean continuing-operations free-cash-flow bridge after the UltraLinQ disposal.

These gaps do not invalidate the ICG thesis, but they limit the value assigned to software and adjacent investments.

Revision history